

# Security Requirements for Crypto Devices

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## Document Control

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## 1 Introduction

The X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI mandates that the private key of a subscriber should be stored in a Hardware Cryptographic Module /token which have been validated to FIPS 140-1/2 Level 2 or higher for class 2 and class 3 DSCs.

This document defines the security requirements for crypto devices used by the end users in performing digital signatures functions. In this document, crypto device is referred as a PKI Smart card or a PKI crypto token.

### Purpose

The purpose of this document is to specify the requirements for crypto device to be used in carrying out digital signatures in India.

### Scope

The scope of this effort is limited to crypto devices and includes all hardware, firmware and software embedded in the crypto devices. The scope of this effort also includes conditional requirements, i.e., requirements that must be met if certain conditions hold true.

## 2 Crypto device Requirements

This section contains the mandatory requirements for crypto devices and ways to test each of the requirements.

### 2.1 Functions Prior to User Authentication:

The functions that can be performed before user authentication shall:

- a) be limited to access and use of public information such as examination of public key certificates; and
- b) Shall not include any access or operation involving private or secret key operations.

#### FIPS

FIPS 140-2 does not contain the notion of functions that can be performed prior to authentication explicitly.

An analysis must be conducted of functions that can be performed prior to authentication to ensure that they meet the requirement stated above.

Functional security testing must be conducted using the functional specification to confirm that no other functions can be performed prior to authentication other than

those listed in the documents

## 2.2 User Authentication:

User Authentication mechanism shall meet the following requirements:

- a) Authentication mechanism shall be such that a random guess has less than 1 in 1,000,000 probability of success.
- b) Authentication mechanism shall be such that multiple random guesses in any one minute interval shall have less than 1 in 100,000 probability of success.
- c) Authentication information stored on the crypto device in any form (e.g., plaintext, cryptographic hash, encrypted) shall be protected from unauthorized access or modification in order to protect from offline dictionary attack.
- d) In order to prevent unauthorized access, the mechanism should also have provision to disable access to the file system of PKI Crypto device / Crypto token after a pre-defined unsuccessful attempts of user authentication. The maximum number of such attempts shall not be more than 10.

### FIPS

Requirements are fully addressed by FIPS 140-2. Thus, no additional analysis is required for FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher validated products for a, b & c. The implementation of d should be verified

## 2.3 Physical Security:

The crypto device shall be designed to either detect physical tampering or to zeroize upon physical tampering. Physical tamper detection can be implemented on the chip or the crypto device.

The crypto device shall successfully undergo the process of Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. These Security requirements cover different areas related to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. A copy of such validation certificate shall be submitted by the crypto device vendor for each device.

### FIPS

Requirements are fully addressed by FIPS 140-2. Thus, no additional analysis is required for FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher validated products.

#### 2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms:

The crypto device shall successfully undergo FIPS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) for each FIPS algorithm claimed to be implemented. If the crypto device generates keys for a FIPS algorithm, the crypto device shall also successfully undergo FIPS CAVP for key generation for that algorithm.

##### **FIPS**

This requirement must be satisfied using CAVP algorithm certificate. However The crypto device shall support either ECC or RSA or both as per the key length specified in the IOG issued by CCA

#### 2.5 Key Entry:

The crypto device shall only import keys into crypto device in encrypted form. The encryption mechanism and key encrypting keys shall be at least as strong as the key being imported.

##### **FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 addresses the key entry requirement, but does not address the security strength of the keys. For the FIPS 140-2 validated products, it would be sufficient to examine if the cryptographic algorithms and key size used for encrypting the keys are commensurate with the key being entered

#### 2.6 Key Output:

The crypto device shall be pre-configured to make private keys to be non-exportable in any form.

##### **FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 addresses the key output requirement, but does not address the disabling the option of exporting the keys. This functionality should be verified.

#### 2.7 Key Zeroization:

The crypto device shall provide a mechanism to zeroize the card by zeroizing all keys, passwords, PINs, seeds, etc., held on the crypto device.

**FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 address this requirement

**2.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC):**

The crypto device shall conform to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by United States 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for business use)

**FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 addresses this requirement.

**2.9 Power Up Self-Tests:**

The crypto device shall undergo self-tests during power-up to ensure that the underlying hardware is operating correctly.

**FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 addresses this requirement indirectly by specifying a list of tests for cryptographic operations.

**2.10 Interface Specification:**

The product documentation shall describe all interfaces to the cryptographic module, including Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). The API shall describe each interface in full detail including, function call, description of the function, inputs, outputs, errors and exceptions, and side effects.

**FIPS**

For FIPS 140-2 evaluated products, it is possible that a well-written and complete security policy covers the functional specification under the services and functions available to each role.

For FIPS 140-2 validated products that are not have ADV\_FSP.4 or higher security assurance requirement, the vendor should be required to provide a complete functional specification.

**2.11 Key Management Document:**

The documentation shall describe types of internal and user keys and their life-cycle and states in terms of the following:

- a) Algorithm and mode for the key and the key size
- b) Whether the key is generated onboard on the crypto device or imported
- c) Whether the key can be output
- d) How the key can be destroyed/zeroized
- e) Functions/purposes key is used for

#### **FIPS**

This document is not required by FIPS 140-2 explicitly. It is possible that the other required documents contain the information sought here. But it is better to have this information properly organized in a single document. The information from this document should be used to perform the analysis of the keys and their security. The information from this document should also be used for cross-checking consistency with the Functional Specification and the completeness and accuracy of the functional specification.

### **2.12 Mitigation of Other Attacks:**

The documentation shall describe which, if any, side channels are mitigated by the crypto device design. Examples of side channel attacks are Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Timing Analysis, and Fault Injection. The documentation shall describe how each attack is mitigated and what testing has been conducted to prove the effectiveness of mitigation.

It is always desirable to have mitigation against attacks listed herein. Whether to mandate protection against these attacks or not is dependent on the crypto device functionality and environment the card will be used in. For example, if the card has some stored value where the user of the crypto device has vested interest in compromising its security, protection against these attacks is a must. The protection against timing analysis is very critical if the end system used to invoke the crypto device is not sufficiently trustworthy and may have Trojan Horses.

#### **FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 validated products have this as optional requirement. Thus, examination of FIPS 140-2 validation certificate and security policy document (both publically accessible) will reveal which, if any, attacks are mitigated.

### **2.13 Operating System Security:**

If application software such as applets can be loaded on the crypto device, the following requirements shall be met:



- a) **Self-Protection:** The operating system shall be designed to protect itself from external interference and tampering, including attack from applications.
- b) **Non-Bypassable:** The security enforcing functions of the operating system shall not be bypassable.
- c) **Domain Isolation:** The operating system shall provide each application an execution domain that cannot be interfered with.
- d) **Identification & Authentication:** The operating system shall provide mechanism for users and applications to authenticate to the operating system for access control purposes. The operating system shall protect the authentication mechanism and authentication databases (e.g., plaintext or encrypted forms of passwords and PINs) as part of self-protection.
- e) **Access Control:** The operating system shall enforce an access control policy in terms of applications being able to access data and other applications.
- f) **Residual Information Protection:** The operating system shall ensure that the previous information contents are unavailable when a resource (e.g., memory) is allocated.

**FIPS**

FIPS 140-2 addresses these requirements by requiring a trusted operating system at EAL 2 or higher for 13 a-c. No additional verification is required for FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Higher' validated crypto devices for 13 d-f

**2.14 Key Storage:**

The crypto device should store private and secret keys in encrypted form. Decryption shall require entry of password or PIN. In other words, password or PIN shall be used to derive the key encrypting key.

Note that it is critical that the crypto device does not have information stored in the crypto device that can be used to decrypt the key; it should require some user entered information to reconstitute the key decrypting key. This approach provides added protection against physically hacking the crypto device.

**FIPS**

This is not a requirement for FIPS 140-2. Thus, this will require additional testing

### 2.15 Key Zeroization:

The crypto device should provide a mechanism to zeroize a specific key.

#### FIPS

This is not a requirement for FIPS 140-2. Thus, in order to meet this requirement Functional Specification and Key Management document should be examined and analyzed to determine which keys or types of keys can be zeroized individually.

### 2.16 Application Integrity:

For the software (e.g., Applet) being loaded, the operating system should verify integrity, source, and source authorization using cryptographic means such as digital signature verification or HMAC verification.

#### FIPS

FIP 140-2 addresses this requirement.

### 2.17 Admin Password feature for USB-based crypto device

Generally, crypto devices have a User Module & Admin Module. The commonly used functions are below

- User Module: Change User PIN, Token Name, Delete Keys, Access to keys for signing / Encryption
- Admin Module: Reset User PIN, Initialize token, Key Zeroization

The crypto device should meet the following criteria:

- a) The OEM or authorized representative of the crypto device shall offer the crypto devices for issuance of DSC by CAs without having a PIN reset option by any means. Such crypto devices shall have new unique Serial Number series. The serial number should start with the first two letters representing OEM.
- b) From 01.04.2023 onwards, CAs shall allow only the download of DSC on the crypto tokens holding the new unique serial number and having no user PIN reset option by any means.

- c) The resetting PIN of the crypto token holding a valid encryption certificate issued before 01.01.2022 shall be carried only after the authentication of the subscriber by CA. The resetting password of the crypto device having an encryption certificate shall be carried out only by the Token Manufacturer or authorized representative organization (in the absence of the OEM office in India).

The Admin Password should be maintained in a controlled manner wherein it should be used only for specific administrative purposes and should not be exposed in any manner which can lead to compromising the security of the device or misuse

## **2.18 General Requirements for USB-based Crypto Devices.**

- a) A unique Serial Number shall be generated by the Cryptographic Hardware manufacturer for each Token. Such Unique Serial Numbers should be stored inside the token file system and also engraved on the token shell. The Cryptographic Hardware manufacturer shall provide necessary libraries to the CAs to read the make, model & Unique Serial Number from the token file system and record the same while generating key pair or while downloading the DSC into the token.
- b) The Crypto Devices should have product-specific interface software and should be made available for various versions of Windows, Mac, iOS, Linux, and Android by Manufacturers and Suppliers. The crypto device interface software shall be made available by the OEM of the crypto device within three months, from the date of release of the latest version of the Operating system.
- c) The crypto device vendors should make available a single web page containing all the details of the Crypto Device and the same shall be shared with CAs. The details should be downloadable from the same site where the page is hosted.
- d) To ensure transparency on the certification & security aspects, the brand name of the Token should bear the name of the OEM as mentioned in its module validation report (FIPS). The firmware name & version should match its module validation report (FIPS). The software embedded in the crypto devices should be of the same OEM. The certified product should be verifiable physically as well as electronically using software tools.
- e) Other than OEM offering, the customization of tokens and custom branding is not allowed. The OEM interface software should allow the co-existence of other crypto OEM interfaces in the user's system.
- f) CA shall remove Cryptographic Device products from their empanelled list upon the revocation of the FIPS validation certificate which was referenced in this document to demonstrate compliance with crypto device requirements.

- g) Crypto Device having Historical FIPS certificate status, relied on this document, to be discontinued by CAs from 1st April 2023 onwards.

### **3 Audit Requirements**

- a) For the compliance audit, the security requirements mentioned in this document refer to the underlying certification (FIPS) of the crypto device, for cross-verification. The overall security requirements mentioned in this document should refer to FIPS where the certification of both hardware and firmware is covered under the same OEM & version.
- b) Token Manufacturer (OEM) or representative organization (in the absence of OEM office in India) should engage a Cert-in empanelled auditor to carry out Smartcard Security Assessment. If the representative organization engages an auditor, then an authorization certificate from the OEM for appointing an auditor should be submitted to CA along with the audit report.
- c) CA should empanel the Cryptographic Device product with Module Name, OEM Name & Version (HW, FW & SW) Information, based on audited report and certificate.
- d) If the product version undergoes any change to the auditable parameters, a fresh audit needs to be carried out.
- e) For each version of the product, CA shall list the Crypto devices only after the successful completion of the audit

### **4 Action on Token suppliers /OEM**

In the case of non-compliance to the CCA-CRPTO version 2.0, CCA may consider black-listing/de-empaneling the crypto device product at the discretion of CCA-

## Audit Checklist

SN	Criteria under	Compliance
1	2.1 Functions Before User Authentication	
2	2.1 User Authentication	
3	2.2 User Authentication	
4	2.3 Physical Security (CMVP)	
5	2.4 Cryptographic Algorithms (CAVP Certificate)	
6	2.5 Key Entry	
7	2.6 Key Output	
8	2.7 Key Zeroization	
9	2.8 EMI/EMC	
10	2.9 Power Up Self-Tests	
11	2.10 Interface Specification	
12	2.12 Mitigation of Other Attacks	
13	2.13 Operating System Security	
14	2.14 Key Storage	
15	2.15 Key Zeroization	
16	2.16 Application Integrity	
17	2.17 Admin Password feature	
18	2.18 General requirements	

## 19 List of Acronyms

API	Application Programming Interface
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC	Common Criteria
CCA	Controller of Certifying Authorities
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DEMA	Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard (United States Standards)
PP	Protection Profile
SCP	Secure Channel Protocol
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
ST	Security Target
US	United States

## Change History

SL	DATE	SECTION	MODIFICATION
1.	20.06.2018	2.17(a)	substituted the word "subscriber" in place of "user"
2.	14.11.2022	2(17), 2(18),3 & 4	Removed PIN reset, unique OEM brandname, software, historical, revocation , de-empanellment options.